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There is growing recognition in North America that action to combat the 
threat of global warming can no longer be postponed. With the Canadian 
and US economies so intimately linked by trade and facing sizable new 
economic challenges in the wake of the financial crisis, developing a 
coordinated response to climate policy is more important than ever. Both 
President Obama and Prime Minister Harper have expressed a willingness 
to work together on this issue. What form this effort takes and whether or 
not it succeeds remains to be seen.
Serious consideration is being given to the idea of establishing some form 
of cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This is good 
news — experience shows that such a system could lower substantially 
the cost of achieving environmental goals. Estimates suggest that cap-and-
trade cut the cost of controlling US sulphur dioxide emissions roughly in 
half relative to traditional “command-and-control” regulations.
While Canada and the United States have a long history of successful 
cooperation, the history of international negotiations on climate change 
policy is littered with failed attempts. One main stumbling block has been 
the difficulty of establishing a global consensus on a set of emissions 
reduction targets, which was the guiding principle behind the Kyoto 
Protocol. In the absence of such a consensus, countries have failed to live 
up to their commitments or refused to set meaningful targets in the first 
place.
That consensus has proven elusive is not particularly surprising. At least 
in the near future, reducing emissions will come at the cost of reduced 
economic activity, principally in the form of reduced competitiveness in 
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international markets. A country that unilaterally adopts a relatively aggressive emissions reduction target at 
home risks sending business to competitors abroad. From this perspective, each country has a strong incentive 
to be the one that retains the competitive advantage after emission reductions take place. Given this underlying 
dynamic, negotiation is daunting even when just two countries are involved, never mind when hundreds of 
parties are at the table.
To succeed, Canada and the United States need to avoid the pitfalls that have plagued the Kyoto process. 
Can the consensus problem be structured so as to make getting to “yes” easier? Recent research suggests 
that one possible way forward is to establish international trade in emissions permits, which could produce 
global emissions reductions even in the absence of a global consensus on a set of emissions targets.1 Trade 
in permits would reduce the cost of achieving emissions targets and help to circumvent the competitiveness 
issue by creating a new market — the market for permits — in which countries could compete. Furthermore, 
partnerships that involve only a few key members could result in a substantial reduction in global emissions.  
For Canada and the United States, two of the closest trading partners in the world, establishing trade in 
emissions permits would represent only a relatively small change in their existing relations and deliver 
potentially large economic and environmental gains to both.
How would such a scheme work? Each country’s federal government could establish its own cap-and-trade 
system. The caps, which would establish the total emissions reduction for which each country would be 
responsible, would be set according to each country’s own best interests. The trade element of the agreement 
would mirror the permit exchanges that take place between domestic polluters in a domestic cap-and-trade 
system — in effect, the domestic system would be open to polluters on both sides of the border. In principle, 
trade in permits could be treated the same as trade in goods covered under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement.
Why would such a system work? First, trade in permits is desirable from a cost perspective. Just as domestic 
trade in permits under existing cap-and-trade systems ensures that polluters undertake emissions reductions 
at the lowest cost, international trade in permits would ensure that Canada and the United States meet their 
respective targets using the lowest-cost options available in North America. To the extent that international trade 
in permits lowered cost, it would be possible to set more ambitious reduction targets. Since the effects of GHG 
emissions are independent of where they occur, it makes no difference whether reductions take place in Canada 
or in the United States as long as the total level of emissions is reduced.
Trade in permits is also desirable from the perspective of inducing broader support for reducing GHG emissions 
because, under this approach, permits would become a valuable commodity, and polluters would be motivated 
to reduce emissions in order to improve their bottom line. Moreover, trade in permits would help to mitigate the 
competitiveness concerns that accompany the choice of steep reduction targets by substituting for trade in other 
goods.
Finally, the gains from trade in permits, to a large extent, would be independent of the ability of countries to 
negotiate abatement targets. Countries with a strong interest in curbing climate change have a natural incentive 
to reduce emissions, but trade in permits would also give countries that lack interest in climate change policy a 
reason to cut back. Permit-exporting countries would have to keep their emissions targets low or risk flooding 
the market with permits, which would drive down the price and decrease the value of their permit exports.
 
1 Jared C. Carbone, Carsten Helm, and Thomas F. Rutherford, “The Case for International Emission Trade in the Absence of 
Cooperative Climate Policy,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (forthcoming).
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Along the same lines, many worry that Canada could not or would not choose an aggressive enough emissions 
reduction target because of Alberta’s valuable and emissions-intensive oil sands industry. In fact, limiting 
emissions could work in the industry’s favour by tending to raise the price of petroleum products exported to 
the United States, resulting in higher revenues. For its part, the United States would have an incentive to keep 
emissions down in order to depress the price of imported energy. 
All of these mechanisms would work in favour of stronger emissions reductions and none  would make one 
partner beholden to the objectives of the other. Taken in this light, devoting so much diplomatic energy to 
negotiating target levels seems misplaced; it is in the interest of everyone’s bottom line to start trading now — 
the environmental gains would follow. 
This last feature of international trade in permits points to benefits that extend beyond a Canada-United States 
partnership: an even larger market for permit trade exists between developed and developing countries because 
of the many opportunities for low-cost reductions in emissions in the developing world.2  Yet another benefit of 
trade in permits between Canada and the United States is the model it would serve for future partnerships with 
developing countries such as China and India. Permit trade with such countries is not only desirable from the 
perspective of reducing costs; it would also produce meaningful reductions in the global level of GHGs. One 
main objection to the structure of the Kyoto Protocol was that it lacked binding emissions targets for rapidly 
developing countries. The fear was (and remains) that, if nothing held them in check, the growth in emissions 
from such countries would offset any climate benefits from costly efforts to control emissions in the developed 
world.
It would be in the self-interest of countries such as China and India to participate in international trade in 
permits even if improving the environment is not currently a  national priority. Chinese and Indian companies 
that held permits would stand to make a considerable amount of money by selling permit rights to companies 
in the developed world and by finding ways to reduce their own emissions. As well, the Chinese and Indian 
governments could further the interests of domestic permit holders by setting aggressive reduction targets to 
maintain high prices for their exported permits.
International trade in permits between large developed and developing world partners could roughly double the 
size of emissions reductions these countries could afford to make. Moreover, such partnerships would encourage 
them to engage in permit trade not from the point of view of sacrifice for the greater good but because it would 
serve their national interests, resulting in partnerships that represent credible commitments, rather than goodwill 
gestures.
The devil is, as always, in the details. Experience shows that specific design features can make a big difference 
in how cap-and-trade systems perform, with legitimate concerns regarding issues such as industry coverage and 
exemptions, whether initial allocations of permits should be grandfathered or auctioned off (or both), and how 
baseline emissions trajectories should be established for the treatment of carbon offsets.
The European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS), established in 2005, is the world’s first experience 
with large-scale trade in GHG emissions permits, and offers important lessons on how an international system of 
trade in permits might work. Among its more remarkable features is its embrace of a decentralized structure in 
which EU member states have a large degree of autonomy in their choice of reduction targets. It is still too early 
to tell how EU ETS will perform over the longer term, but one can draw a number of important conclusions 
2 Abatement costs are thought to be lower in developing countries for a number of reasons, a major one being that these countries have 
old, inefficient power plants that could be upgraded to newer facilities with substantially smaller carbon footprints. Far fewer of these 
low-hanging fruit exist in developed countries, where upgrading has already taken place.
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from its initial period of operation.
The program’s main source of criticism so far draws on the significant price volatility that the market 
experienced early on and the poor estimates of baseline emissions levels, which resulted in an overallocation 
of permits. Both problems, however, proved to be confined to the program’s “teething phase” rather than 
representative of systemic issues. More notable, given the short time frame in which the trial period was 
organized, is the fact that EU ETS has succeeded in establishing a credible market, with large volumes of trade 
and an informative price signal. Furthermore, it achieved this important objective without endless negotiations 
over emissions targets. The EU Commission had the final say on each country’s targets but, for the most part, 
the targets member countries submitted were accepted with minor revisions or no revisions at all.3
Remarks by both President Obama and Prime Minister Harper suggest that a cap-and-trade approach to 
controlling GHG emissions is now on the negotiating table. This is good news. The next step is to open 
discussions to implement trade in emissions permits between Canada and the United States and to explore 
similar relationships across the globe.
3 See A. Denny Ellerman and Paul L. Joskow, “The European Union’s Emissions Trading System in Perspective” (Arlington, VA: Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change, 2008).
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